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1 Introduction
Political leaders - local and national - are not reticent in taking credit for investment
flowing into their jurisdictions. This is not surprising given that foreign direct investment
(FDI) contributes significantly to the vitality of most modern economies. The ability
to attract and retain outside investment is often an important part of the prospectus of
candidates from both major parties in US gubernatorial elections.
Foreign investors make their investment decisions in a very complex environment.
They are typically less informed about the local policy environment when operating
abroad and may be treated differently than domestic investors (Bhattacharya et al.
(2007)). Additional layers of rules and regulations associated with national boundaries
such as capital controls and differential tax treatments may be imposed on foreign in-
vestment (Julio and Yook (2016)). Moreover, foreign investment is hard to be reversed
without paying high costs (Rivoli and Salorio (1996)). As a result, FDI is more sensitive
to the regulatory environment than domestic investment.
The literature on FDI determinants documents a number of factors multinational
companies consider. The traditional factors may include, market size and growth po-
tential (Resmini (2000)), industry clustering (Wheeler and Mody (1992)), labor market
flexibility and financial depth (Yu and Walsh (2010)), infrastructure (Dunning (1998),
Blonigen and Piger (2014)). More recent literature points out that in addition to cost-
benefit calculations, foreign direct investment could be explained more broadly by social
ties of firm managers or diaspora networks (Bandelj (2011), Leblang (2010)).
Moreover, the political factors, such as taxes, policy instruments, regulations, gov-
ernmental institutions can influence the local business climates and subsequently firm
location decisions (Fox (1996)). For example, as the largest single investment in Ten-
nessee’s history, Nissan’s assembly plant investment in 1982 is an example illustrating
the promotional role of the state. Lamar Alexander, a Republican who was governor of
Tennessee when Nissan opened its factory in Tennessee made many efforts to encourage
this investment. In fall of 1979, shortly after his inauguration, Lamar Alexander flew to
1
Japan to meet Nissan executives and show the advantages of Tennessee. Nissan finally
agreed to locate in Tennessee, and at the same time, Tennessee spent 12 million USD
for new roads to the facility, and provided a 7 million USD grant for training plant em-
ployees and a 10 million USD county tax break (Kotabe (1993)). When Nissan came to
Tennessee, there were almost no auto jobs in the state and 30 years later, one-third of the
manufacturing jobs in Tennessee are auto-related. This is regarded as one of Alexander’s
biggest accomplishments as governor.
The political parties are important to FDI decisions as they have implications for
foreign investment relevant policies such as tax and other financial incentives as well as
other policies that are applicable to both domestic and foreign firms such as industry
regulations. These policies can affect the risk and return of the foreign investment.
While there are many some correlational studies relating the political ‘type’ of those
holding office to the vigor of FDI into states, countries and cities, there is no empirical
evidence (from the US or anywhere else) of any causal link. This is the gap that we
seek to fill in this paper. More concretely our research question is: Are Democrat or
Republican state Governors better at attracting FDI?
The empirical evidence on the matter is mixed. Using a pooled cross-section data,
Halvorsen and Jakobsen (2013) find that on average FDI is higher in Republican governed
states. That effect is not statistically significant, however, leading them to conclude that
“... foreign direct investors seem relatively agnostic with respect to the question of which
party controls the state government” (page 182). McMillan (2009) finds a significant
and positive relationship between Democratic governorship and FDI. Using a slightly
different measure Fox (1996) also finds a positive and significant association between
Democratic governorship and the foreign firm location decisions.1 With a focus on na-
tional governments Pinto and Pinto (2008) argue that government’s partisanship should
affect foreign investors’ decision to flow into different sectors of the host country. In par-
ticular jurisdictions with left-leaning governments experience greater inflow into sectors
where investment can be expected to be good to labor, since left-leaning governments
1Fox (1996) provides a detailed discussion of why the effect of party could go either way, and in setting
up her hypotheses is non-committal on expected sign.
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cater to labor. While right-leaning governments are likely to attract foreign investment
that would flow into those sectors where FDI could help increase the rents of domestic
businesses.
The central problem with existing studies such as these is that they point only to
correlations and are unable to speak to issues of causation. This is a big limitation.
For example, states that have unobserved characteristics that predispose them to elect
Republican governors also have characteristics (perhaps the same characteristics, perhaps
others) that make them attractive targets for inward investment. At the same time there
may be causal effects running in the opposite direction. A state that is successful in
attracting much foreign investment might (for whatever reason) develop economically or
socially in a way that makes it more likely to vote for a particular type of leader.
We apply a regression discontinuity design (RDD) to a set of narrow margin guberna-
torial elections between 1977 and 2004 to generate the first evidence of a causal link from
the party affiliation of the governor of a state to the level and pattern of FDI that flows
into that state.2 The identifying assumption that underpins the application of RDD to
close elections is that when one party or the other wins by a sufficiently narrow margin
then the partisanship of the victory can be regarded as being (close to) random (Lee
(2008), Eggers et al. (2015)).
In brief our results are as follows. The election of a Republican as governor has a
statistically significant positive effect on net FDI inflows in manufacturing industries to
a state. The effect is substantial - 17% in aggregate dollars in our preferred specification
- and is sustained throughout the term of office. Interestingly it makes no significant
difference to the total value of FDI inflow. The results are relatively undisturbed by
inclusion or exclusion of a range of controls, and prove robust to a variety of robustness
tests.
We will point to various strands of related literature (de la Cuesta and Imai (2016),
Eggers et al. (2015), Grimmer et al. (2011)). However we deliberately exclude claims of
the channels through which party-affiliation might matter. Indeed one attraction of the
2A popular survey of methods and applications is by Lee and Lemieux (2010). Lee (2008) and Angrist
and Pischke (2008) also provide good overviews.
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RDD method is that it allows the researcher to remain agnostic as to the mechanism
or mechanisms at play. The powers of a Governor are manifold, and the partisanship
of the officeholder might influence investment flows through various channels. Some of
these might be direct, such as inducements and trade visits. Others indirect. Foreign in-
vestors may be attracted to places with low taxes, flexible regulators, promise a responsive
workforce or offer cohesive social settings (Head et al. (1999)).
There are often-claimed partisan differences in approach to economic policy which
might influence the type of investor to which a state appeals. The party affiliations of
politicians can reflect the kinds of policies that states adopt to promote economic devel-
opment (Quinn and Shapiro (1991)). Ideology-induced policies are especially prevalent
at state level in the US (Potrafke (2018)).
Republicans generally prefer an investment-driven growth model that pursue invest-
ment through direct business-friendly approaches. Available tools at state level for direct
measures include various forms of tax incentives, direct grants or subsidies for business,
state programs to promote RD, low-interest loans, subsidized training of employees and
cheap access to land. Also, prior studies find evidence that Republican governors are
more active in deregulating labor markets (Bjørnskov and Potrafke (2013))and less active
in protecting environment (Beland and Boucher (2015)).
Democrats are likely to favor a consumption-driven growth model that seek to en-
courage investment through indirect, redistributive measures. Indirect measures involve
a preference for higher taxation and higher government spending. In terms of allocation
of state expenditures, Democratic governments are associated with higher spending in
education, health and public safety sectors and lower spending on natural resources and
highways (Beland and Oloomi (2017)). In addition, under Democratic governors, states
have a higher minimum wage, lower post-tax inequality and unemployment rate (Leigh
(2008)).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes methods and data.
Section 3 reports results. Section 4 concludes.
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2 Research Design
In this section we outline our methods and data sources, including discussion of assump-
tions and potential challenges to compelling identification.
2.1 Methods
Early applications of regression discontinuity method to close election datasets demon-
strated the possibility of incumbency advantage (Lee (2008)), policy responsiveness (Lee
et al. (2004)) and the rents from holding office (Eggers and Hainmueller (2009)). Sev-
eral authors have used the method to explore the effects of partisanship on other eco-
nomic outcomes. For example, Ferreira et al. (2009), Gerber and Hopkins (2011) and
de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw (2016) present corresponding empirical evidence on
close US mayor election and the size of government. Innes and Mitra (2015) looked at
election and regulatory outcomes; Beland (2015) at labor market outcomes; and Leigh
(2008) at numerous policy settings, including minimum wage, post-tax inequality, and
unemployment rate.
Our preferred results rely on the non-parametric local polynomial estimation methods
due to Calonico et al. (2014). The method fits a weighted polynomial function to observa-
tions above and below the discontinuity within a particular bandwidth. The polynomial
function usually takes order 1 or 2, and the weights are determined endogenously, not
by researcher discretion, by a kernel function that performs the computation based on
the distance of observations from the discontinuity. Within the bandwidth, the closer the
observation is to the discontinuity the more heavily it is weighted.
The steps in estimation are as follows.
First, a bandwidth h is selected. The bandwidth is the width of the interval around
the discontinuity within which the local polynomial is fitted. Typically this choice has
been made arbitrarily, and for election-based studies has been set at 5% or 10% winning
margins (de la Cuesta and Imai (2016), Erikson et al. (2015), Beland (2015)). In choosing
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bandwidth the researcher faces a trade-off between bias and variance.3 We follow the
procedure developed in Calonico et al. (2014) for choosing the optimal bandwidth - that
which minimizes the asymptotic mean squared error (MSE) of the regression discontinuity
estimator, where MSE is the sum of the bias squared and variance of the estimator. The
choice of optimal bandwidth also means that we avoid ad hoc decisions and the risk of
(conscious or inadvertent) specification searching.
Second, a kernel function K(·) is chosen. The function assigns non-negative weights
to each observation xi around the cut-off c and within the bandwidth. The commonly
used kernel function is the triangular kernel function which applies more weight to obser-
vations closer to the cut-off. Using the kernel function we compute a weight wi for each
observation where
wi = K ((xi − c) /h) .
Third, weighted least squares regression is run separately on the set of observations
that are above the cut-off but within the bandwidth and those below the cut-off but within
the bandwidth on the choice of the polynomial. The order of the polynomial should be
kept low and high order of the polynomials tends to lead to approximation error due to
the overfitting and biases at the boundary points (Skovron and Titiunik (2015)).
Finally, we take the difference of the two estimated intercepts and get the regression
discontinuity estimate. In effect the size of the ‘jump’ in the outcome variable that occurs
at the discontinuity. Once we get the point estimate, we are interested in constructing the
confidence interval and testing the hypothesis. Under the MSE optimal local polynomial
estimation, the conventional inference method has been shown to be invalid (Skovron and
Titiunik (2015)), so we adopt the robust confidence intervals proposed in Calonico et al.
(2014).
To implement the local linear version we fit weighted linear regression functions to the
observations within a bandwidth h on either side of the cut-off point c. In other words,
3As observations fall further from the discontinuity - margin of victory is greater - the as-good-as-
random assignment assumption becomes less palatable, introducing the risk of bias. A broader band-












(yi − α2 − β2(xi − c))2wi (2)
Given the estimates of α̂1 and α̂2, the estimated average treatment effect is
τ̂rd = α̂2 − α̂1 (3)
In this paper, we estimate the local treatment effect, following the methodology pro-
posed by Calonico et al. (2014). The local linear regression offers flexibility with little loss
of statistical power. We have adopted what we believe to be current best practice in RDD
to model the relationship between assignment and outcome variable, using local linear
estimation with an optimal MSE (mean-square-error), bandwidth and robust confidence
intervals.
2.2 Study Setting
States are the primary subdivisions of the US and have a high degree of autonomy in how
they govern themselves. State governor controls the governmental budget, appoints many
officials, and has a plethora or other powers. Governors can veto bills and, in many cases,
have the power of the line-item veto on appropriation bills. In addition to hard authority,
the governor can also bring to bear significant ‘soft’ power through the authority given
to him/her by his/her office. In summary, governors are influential players in US politics.
A governor may run his/her state in a way that makes it more or less attractive
to a prospective international investor. In addition, in recent decades they have been
increasingly visible players on the international scene. External state-promotional activity
dates back to the 1970s (Fry (1998), Watson (1995)) and has focussed on promoting trade
and attracting inward investment. As regards FDI in particular, states take the lead role
in recruitment of inward investment, with the role of the federal government much smaller.
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Many state-operated international offices and governor-led overseas missions are set up to
attract FDI (McMillan (2009)). US state officials claim that the international trade and
investment is the largest category of state international engagement (Whatley (2003)).
As a result, the governor of a state acts as the chief economic ‘ambassador’ in appealing
to prospective investors.
2.3 Data
We obtain data from several sources. Our outcome variable of interest is FDI. State
level FDI data is drawn from US Bureau of Economic Analysis. We first obtain the total
monetary amount of FDI stock and the FDI stock in manufacturing sectors in each US
State for each year from 1977 to 2004. The FDI stock refers to the real book value of
gross property, plant, and equipment (PPE) of all nonbank affiliates. This includes the
value of buildings, structures, machinery, and equipment, etc., but excludes inventories
and intangible assets. It corresponds to the standard definition of FDI in the US. We
are interested in FDI flows, so we take the difference between the FDI measures in the
year governor was elected (elections almost always occur in November) and each of the
four years following where governor took the office respectively. So for example, if the
a governor wins a close election in November 2005 we take the difference between FDI
stock in 2005 with that stock in 2006, 2007, 2008 and 2009. This allows us to answer
four slightly different questions: How much ‘extra’ FDI does a governor of a particular
political persuasion attract in his first year in office, first two years in office, etc. In most
cases the fourth variant can be taken to approximate the extra FDI across the whole term
in office. In addition, taking changes in the outcome variable (rather than working with
levels) serves to increase the statistical efficiency of our regression discontinuity design
(Lee and Lemieux (2010)).
Table 1 presents summary statistics for FDI and other covariates. The mean FDI
stock per capita across the whole of the US is 2796 USD and the mean FDI stock per
capita in the manufacturing sector 921 USD.
The data on gubernatorial elections are obtained from two sources. The election data
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from 1977 to 1990 is drawn from dataset Candidate and Constituency Statistics of Elec-
tions in the United States, 1788-1990 (ICPSR 7757) from the Inter-university Consortium
for Political and Social Research. The remaining election data comes from Dave Leip’s
Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections (Leip (2008)).
Gubernatorial elections usually take place in November and the governor elected takes
power in the following January. A governor’s term usually is four years.4 We define the
election margin to be the percentage of votes obtained by the Republican candidate minus
the percentage obtained by the Democrat. Following that convention the discontinuity
is at zero (we can ignore third candidates). If the election margin is positive (negative),
the Republican (Democrat) has won.
Table 2 summarizes outcomes in the 361 elections in our sample. Of those Republicans
won 186, Democrats won 175 times. In terms of close elections we count for the purpose
of this summary table those with winning margins of 5% and 10%. Within a 5% interval
around the cut-off, we get 81 elections of which Republicans won 42 times, Democrats
won 39 times. Of the 157 elections within 10% of the cut-off Republicans won in 80,
Democrats in 77. So by each of these metrics the sample is roughly balanced, no party
seems systematically more likely to prevail when result margins are narrow. If we look
at the elections in terms of incumbents and challengers, we can see that incumbents win
more often. However, in the case of close elections, the winning frequency of incumbents
and challengers are balanced. Incumbents won rough same number of times as challengers
in 5% margins, while challengers won slightly more times in 10% margins. The close-to-
symmetric shape of the barchart of density of winning margins in figure 1 is consistent with
this. Together these numbers suggest that there is no precise manipulation of selection
into the treatment, which would threaten the validity of the identification assumption on
which application of the RDD rests. To back-up this ‘eye-ball’ test, we will conduct and
present the results of more formal tests later.
To improve precision other control variables are included. We control for a number
of factors that could affect the attraction of FDI. First, previous studies have found that
4The exceptions to this are New Hampshire and Vermont, where terms are two years. They do not
feature in our dataset.
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rapid economic growth in the host economy stimulates greater demand for FDI inflows
(Kang and Jiang (2012)). We include the growth rate of gross state product to capture the
economic condition. Higher corporate taxes are expected to deter investment (Wijeweera
et al. (2007)). Thus, we include state’s corporate tax rate. The labor market conditions
have been included in some previous studies (Sethi et al. (2003)). We therefore include
percentage of the state workforce under union contract and average hourly earnings in
manufacturing, which takes into account the cost and quality of the labor. In addition,
we also include population, farmland and urbanization, which plausibly could affect FDI
decisions. Farmland is the percentage of each state’s total acreage that is farmland in
year 2004 and urbanization refers to the percentage of population in urbanized areas and
urban clusters in the year 2000.
Data for the control variables are obtained from several sources. The labor-related
variables are from U.S. Bureau of Labour Statistics. Figures for educational expenditures
and urbanization are from U.S. Census Bureau. Farmland is from the U.S. Department
of Agriculture Economic Research Service.
3 Results
3.1 Main results
Table 3 and table 4 present main results on the causal impact of the election of a Repub-
lican on (1) FDI per capita and (2) FDI in manufacturing per capita. Significance levels
are adjusted by robust inference methods proposed by Calonico et al. (2014). The robust
p-values are regarded as conservative, so the significance of the results reported will also
hold if we were to use conventional p-values. Standard errors are clustered at state level.
Table 3 relates to FDI per capita. The top number in each column is the estimated
discontinuity - the additional FDI causally attributed to a Republican win. In each panel,
column (1) derives from estimates with no controls. Column (2) includes a control for
whether the election was associated with a change in ruling party. Column (3) adds party
change and other controls. The estimates are generally not significant. The second panel
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identifies a positive and significant effect of a Republican win on FDI inflow in the two
year window following an election win, but the value becomes smaller and significance
is lost (even at 10%) once controls are added. Overall the analysis reported in table 3
points to no discernible effect, positive or negative, of a Republican governorship.
Table 4 reports the results of conducting the same exercise but specialized on flows
of FDI per capita into the manufacturing sectors. We find a significant positive effect
of a Republican governor on these flows, which can be interpreted causally. The effect
sustains whole term of governor. The results are relatively insensitive to exclusion or
inclusion of the control for party change or other controls.
Panel 1 implies that in his/her first year in office a Republican governor, other things
equal, attracts an additional 84.28 USD dollars of FDI in manufacturing per head com-
pared to his/her Democratic counterpart. In the first two years he/she attracts an ad-
ditional 131.07 USD. In his/her first three years an additional 239.88 USD is attracted.
And in the full four years of his/her term an additional 156.89 USD is attracted. Note
that these are not ‘within year’ flows, but rather the cumulative effect over four different
time horizons. The state-level average FDI per capita in manufacturing in our sample
is 920.82 USD so against that benchmark, the growth in FDI stock in manufacturing
activities is 17% higher under a Republican governor during a four year term compared
to a the counter-factual of a Democratic governor.
Figure 2 and figure 3 plot the estimates RD estimates of the effects of a Republican
governorship on cumulative FDI per capita (Figure 2) and FDI in manufacturing per
capita (Figure 3) across each of the four time horizons. The plotted estimates are based
on our preferred specifications with all controls and the confidence levels are presented
at 90% and 95%.
Figure 4 present the fitted curves either side of the discontinuity for each of the
four exercises (recall that each exercise refers to a different time horizon over which the
impact of the governorship on cumulative FDI is assessed). The ‘jump’ in the vicinity of
the discontinuity is the effect presented in the earlier tables, and it can be seen here to
be positive in each of the four panels. The size of each dot is determined by the number
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of election data points in each winning margin bucket. While the specifications reported
are estimated over a wider interval, we can see comparatively large dots in the immediate
vicinity either side of the discontinuity, and that visually there is a very apparent step
up from those just to the left of the discontinuity to those just to the right. While
the data points further from the discontinuity are included in the estimates, they carry
correspondingly lower weight.
To summarize; (1) we find no evidence that the political affiliation of the state governor
has a causal impact on total FDI inflow. However, (2) there is a significant (at 1%),
positive and substantial effect of a Republican governorship on inflows of manufacturing
FDI, an effect that is sustained across the whole of the governor’s term in office.
Puzzlingly, we only find significant effects on manufacturing FDI rather than to-
tal FDI. One potential explanation is that manufacturing industries are likely to differ
from non-manufacturing industries with respect to their sensitivity to election outcomes.5
While it is difficult to classify industries as being politically sensitive or not, there are
some guidance from the political economy literature. Herron et al. (1999) attempt to iden-
tify 15 economic sectors as politically sensitive by using measures of candidate electoral
prospects based upon the Iowa Electronic Market during the 1992 Presidential election.
Top three politically sensitive sectors in Herron et al. (1999) are pollution control sec-
tor and aerospace and defense, pharmaceuticals. Also, when analyzing the relationship
between political uncertainty and corporate investment cycles, Julio and Yook (2016) clas-
sify firms in tobacco products, pharmaceuticals, health care services, defense, petroleum
and natural gas, telecommunications, and transportation industries as politically sensi-
tive. The industries identified as politically sensitive in the above studies are mostly
concentrated in manufacturing industries. In addition to the sensitivity of industries, the
other reason might be that one particular target of state economic development efforts
has been the foreign manufacturing firms (Fox (1996)).
5We are grateful to the anonymous reviewer for raising this point.
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3.2 Validity
In this section, we challenge our study design by performing three validity checks.
A key assumption of RDD is the continuity assumption - that the only change which
occurs at the point of discontinuity is the shift in the treatment status.6 This would be
compromised if, for example, one party or the other were able to manipulate the winning
margin such as to be ‘just over the line’. In our setting, the violation of the continuity
assumption would require the eventual winner be able to predict vote shares with extreme
precision and then deploy necessary resources to win the close elections. Existing evidence
suggests that this is not a significant risk in our setting (Eggers et al. (2015), de la Cuesta
and Imai (2016)). However, the following validity checks confirm that there is no evidence
of such sorting behavior.
The standard approach to challenging the random selection into treatment assumption
is the McCrary test (McCrary (2008)). The McCrary test essentially tests for whether
there is discontinuity in the density of the assignment variable in the vicinity of the
discontinuity being used for identification. The McCrary graph is presented in figure 5.
If the parties can manipulate the election results in close elections, we should expect the
proportion of observations just to the left of the cutpoint to be meaningfully different
from those to the right. Sorting, if it exist, would produce a discontinuity in the density
of the forcing variable. We can easily see that the density is smooth around the cut-off
and there is no unusual jump. Consistent with Erikson et al. (2015) and Eggers et al.
(2015), we find no significant discontinuities in the gubernatorial election, suggesting that
there is no evidence of sorting.
We also conduct the density test proposed by Cattaneo et al. (2015), another continuity-
based test of design. It uses a local polynomial density estimator that does not require the
pre-binning of the data and leads to a size and power improvement (Skovron and Titiunik
(2015)). We are able to reject the null hypothesis that the density is discontinuous at the
6de la Cuesta and Imai (2016) distinguish the continuity assumption from the local randomization
assumption, where the latter one is more restricted. For the local randomization assumption to be met,
within a window of pre-specified size around the discontinuity threshold, whether or not an observation
receives the treatment is essentially randomly determined. de la Cuesta and Imai (2016) argue that the
local randomization assumption is not required for the RD design to be valid.
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cut-off with an associated P-value of 0.4496.
To further examine whether the key identification assumption of the RD design is
credible, we conduct tests on a number of covariates. In particular, we perform the esti-
mation on the covariates following the same methodology, and the results are presented in
table 5 and we find no significance for all covariates except corporate tax rate.7 The cor-
porate tax rate is significantly lower under republican governors. This could be a channel
that how republican governors attract more foreign investment. For other covariates, the
results show that party affiliation of the governor has no effect on these variables.
3.3 Methodological robustness
In the main results section we explored the robustness of our main estimates to exclusion
and inclusion of a variety of state-level controls. In this section, we perform sensitivity
tests to examine the robustness of our RDD results as they apply to FDI in manufacturing
to changes in modelling assumptions.8
3.3.1 Senate/House & President
In our preferred specification, we add state and time-varying characteristics including
state population, percentage of the state workforce under union contract, average hourly
earnings in manufacturing, unemployment rate, education expenses, farmland and ur-
banization in order to control for possible confounding factors that might influence the
results.
To better isolate the impact of the gubernatorial election, we include more factors
that may play roles in shaping foreign economic policies. In addition to state governor,
state legislatures are also regarded powerful on international issues (McMillan (2009)).
In table 6 we include the variables indicating which party controls the house and which
7de la Cuesta and Imai (2016) argue that under the continuity assumption, observations on either side
of the discontinuity threshold can systematically differ from each other in many aspects, even by a large
magnitude. The imbalance of barely-winners and barely-losers near the threshold does not necessarily
invalidate the application of the RDD.
8We conducted similar exercises on the aggregate FDI data (that tested the robustness of the results
in table 3) and obtain similar results. In other words the non-significance result in that case proves
robust. We do not report these in detail here.
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controls the senate. Also, the party holds office at national level matters for setting the
economic climate. In table 6 we control that the variables indicating which party the
president belongs to. The results are robust to the inclusion of dummy variables for
having Republicans control the state senate, for Republicans controlling the state house,
and for the president being a Republican.
3.3.2 Governor characteristics
Since 1980, partisan differences have grown rapidly in the US states. The parties have
increasingly diverged in the policies they implement in office. Republican governors do
pursue different policies compared to Democrats (Caughey et al. (2016)). However the
existing evidence show that the educational and occupational background of leaders may
have impacts on outcomes. For example, Besley et al. (2011) show that heterogeneity
among leaders’ educational attainment is important with growth being higher by having
leaders who are more highly educated. Neumeier (2018) finds that the tenures of US state
governors with a business background are associated with higher annual income growth
rate, higher growth rate of the private capital stock, and lower unemployment rate.
In table 7, we control for the educational and occupational background of state gov-
ernors. Specifically, we include three dummy variables. Political experience is a dummy
variable taking the value 1 if the incumbent governor is politically experienced (0 oth-
erwise), which is defined as having held any elected political office at the local, state,
or federal level before the current position. Business experience is a dummy variable
taking the value 1 if the governor was a businessperson prior to entering politics and 0
otherwise. Education background is an indicator whether a governor has low education,
i.a. less than a Master’s degree. The results are presented in table 7. We can see that
our main results are not significantly disturbed by controlling for the educational and
occupational background of state governors.
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3.3.3 Bandwidth
For our preferred estimates we adopted a optimal bandwidth following Calonico et al.
(2014). The optimal bandwidth selected by the method varies between about 7% and 10%
across the specifications. This is similar to the bandwidth chosen (usually arbitrarily) in
other applications of RDD methods to close elections.9 Nonetheless, as robustness checks
we re-run each regression imposing first a 5% and then a 10% bandwidth. The results of
these exercises are presented in table A1. The estimates retain sign and significance and
are similar in value to those from the preferred specifications in table 4.
3.3.4 Order of polynomial
In our base specification we fitted the data linearly on either side of the discontinuity. This
is the preferred approach because Gelman and Imbens (2014) argue that estimators for
causal effects based on high order (third, fourth, or higher) polynomials can be misleading
in the RDD setting. Gelman and Imbens (2014) recommend instead use estimators based
on local linear or quadratic polynomials.
In table A2 we report the results of repeating the exercise but fitting a second-order
polynomial. Again we can see that the size of the estimated effects are little disturbed,
and in all cases the sign and significance of the effect is sustained.
3.3.5 Outliers
In table A3, we address whether the results of our main regressions are driven by the
more industrialized ones. The average share of manufacturing sector in state GDP in our
sample is 16%. The four big industrialized states in our sample are North Carolina (30%),
Indiana (28%), Michigan (27%), Ohio (25%). We re-estimate our preferred specification
but excluding four big industrialized states. It can be seen that the results are similar to
the baseline results, suggesting that geographical heterogeneity does not bias the results.
9Our bandwidth is close to Caughey et al. (2016) who study the effect of guernatorial election outcomes
on policy liberalism and de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw (2016) who use similar bandwidth when
examining how the size of government reacts to outcomes of US mayoral election. Our bandwidth is
tighter than, for example, Klašnja and Titiunik (2014).
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To further allay concerns that the result is being driven by a small number of extreme
observations we perform outlier analysis by winsorizing data at 99% and 95% level. Win-
sorization is the statistical transformation of the data by limiting extreme values in the
data to reduce the effect of (possibly spurious) outliers (winsorization is widely used by
economists (Alesina et al. (2015), Dick and Lehnert (2010)). A 99% winsorization, for
example, would see all data below the 1st percentile set to the 1st percentile, and data
above the 99th percentile set to the 99th percentile. Winsorization methods are usu-
ally more robust to outliers, although there are alternatives, such as trimming, that will
achieve a similar effect. One advantage of winsorization is that the transformation limits
the impact of outliers, without losing observations. The results are presented in the table
A4. The results are little disturbed by the winsorization suggesting that they are not
overly driven by a few extreme-valued outliers.
3.3.6 Alternative denominator for dependent variable
Our central analysis took as dependent variable FDI per capita as out measure of FDI
intensity. An alternative and equally sensible approach would have been to work with
FDI per unit of percentage of state level GSP. To confirm that this would not significantly
have disturbed conclusions we re-estimate our preferred specification on that basis. The
results of this exercise are reported in table A5.
In this version, a Republican governor - compared to the benchmark of a Democrat -
causes a 11% increase in FDI stock in manufacturing as a percentage of the gross state
product after one year and an increase of 27% over the four-year term in office. These
are qualitatively similar to our main results, though somewhat larger in size.
4 Conclusion
Foreign investment plays a crucial role in the American - and other - economies. But how
influential is the type of government in a place in determining the levels or patterns of
inward investment?
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In this paper, we present what we believe to be the first empirical investigation of
a causal link from political partisanship to FDI. As such we provide a further empirical
point-of-connection between political and economic outcomes, with a direction of effect.
To obtain plausibly exogenous assignment of treatment (political party in power) we use
a regression discontinuity design, exploiting the discontinuity generated by the first-past-
the-post election system.
The evidence points to Republican governors causing a substantial and sustained
upward bump in foreign investment into manufacturing activities, when compared to
their Democratic counterparts. However, we find no evidence one way or the other on
total FDI flows, although those effects are much less precisely estimated.
There are some limitations of this study. One limitation of our research design is
that the effects are identified by the subset of gubernatorial election whose vote outcome
is close to the majority threshold. The limitation of such a design is that we are only
able to identify a causal relation locally. Extending the external validity of this study
by identifying natural experiments that apply to a broader universe of party politics and
FDI is an exciting and challenging avenue for future research. Another limitation is that
we only explore the aggregate level of FDI. A fruitful extension of this study is to explore
the partisan effects on more finely classified activities - which types of economic activity
are more or less sensitive to political events than others?
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Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Std. Dev Min Max
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FDI Stock per Capita 2795.70 4972.94 71.77 47463.41
FDI Stock per Capita in Manufacturing 920.82 1017.17 16.61 8322.05
FDI Stock / GSP 0.112 0.143 0.009 1.844
FDI Stock in Manufacturing / GSP 0.041 0.036 0.002 0.275
GSP Growth Rate 3.205 3.910 -18.571 31.576
Corporate Tax Rate 6.823 2.873 0 12.25
Population 4986858 5483532 397363 35842038
Union 15.741 7.142 2.8 38.3
Wage 13.454 1.740 9.589 21.329
Education Expense 32.889 6.268 15.957 50.201
Farm Land 41 24.3 1 93
Urbanization 71.70 14.76 38.2 94.4
Note: Union: percentage of the state workforce under union contract; Wage: average hourly earnings in manufacturing;
Education expense: total state expenditure on education as a percentage of total government expenditure; Farm Land:
the percentage of each state’s total acreage that is farmland in 2004; Urbanization: percentage of population in urbanized
areas and urban clusters in 2000.
Source: FDI-related variables are from U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis;labor-related variables are from U.S. Bureau of
labour statistics; Population, Education and Urbanization variable is from U.S. Census Bureau; Farmland is from U.S.
Department of Agriculture Economic Research Service.
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Table 2: Statistics on Gubernatorial Elections
Number of Elections 5% 10% Total
All elections 81 157 361
Republican won 42 80 186
Democratic won 39 77 175
Incumbent won 41 74 222
Challenger won 40 83 139
Sources: Candidate and Constituency Statistics of Elections in the United States, 1788-1990 (ICPSR 7757) and Dave Leip’s
Atlas of U.S. Presidential Elections.
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Table 3: RD Estimates for FDI Per Capita
One year after election Two years after election
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Repub won 88.38 58.83 136.32 245.47** 235.94** 164.68
(114.89) (109.49) (106.5) (144.82) (149.07) (163.71)
Bandwidth 0.180 0.209 0.168 0.131 0.135 0.126
Party Change X X X X
Controls X X
Effective Observations 215 237 195 171 177 162
Total Observations 341 341 334 336 336 329
Three years after election Four years after election
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Repub won 80.09 55.00 89.24 -197.73 -131.58 -139.57
(225.01) (230.11) (229.5) (272.41) (278.62) (263.25)
Bandwidth 0.179 0.199 0.167 0.193 0.192 0.212
Party Change X X X X
Controls X X
Effective Observations 186 201 169 192 192 199
Total Observations 305 305 301 299 299 295
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated using local-linear regression, optimal bandwidth, triangular kernel and robust confidence intervals calculated
using rdrobust (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014)
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Table 4: RD Estimates for FDI Manufacturing Per Capita
One year after election Two years after election
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Repub won 103.04*** 102.84*** 84.28*** 177.56*** 176.31*** 131.07***
(38.706) (38.193) (30.135) (59.49) (59.394) (48.458)
Bandwidth 0.072 0.074 0.081 0.076 0.077 0.082
Party Change X X X X
Controls X X
Effective Observations 95 98 97 100 100 100
Total Observations 303 303 299 301 301 297
Three years after election Four years after election
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Repub won 240.06*** 242.18*** 239.88*** 145.97** 144.53** 156.89***
(59.21) (59.034) (51.329) (66.121) (65.789) (59.889)
Bandwidth 0.110 0.110 0.105 0.115 0.115 0.111
Party Change X X X X
Controls X X
Effective Observations 126 125 118 129 129 123
Total Observations 288 288 284 284 284 280
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated using local-linear regression, optimal bandwidth, triangular kernel and robust confidence intervals calculated
using rdrobust (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014)
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Table 5: Covariate Balance Tests for Gubernatorial RD Design
Estimate BW CI Pr > |z| N
GSP Growth Rate 0.654 0.147 (-2.888, 4.604) 0.653 273
Corporate Tax Rate -0.601 0.168 (-1.354, -0.074) 0.029 309
Population 94453 0.142 (-199154, 486529) 0.411 345
Union -0.597 0.142 (-2.845, 1.808) 0.662 309
Wage -0.111 0.119 (-0.658, 0.608) 0.939 305
Education Expense -0.429 0.195 (-1.910, 1.437) 0.782 309
Farm land -4.475 0.160 (-25.522, 14.323) 0.582 363
Urbanization 5.188 0.147 (-4.531, 18.136) 0.239 363
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated using local-linear regression, optimal bandwidth, triangular kernel and robust confidence intervals calculated
using rdrobust (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014)
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Table 6: RD Estimates for FDI Manufacturing Per Capita: Senate/House/President
One year after election Two years after election
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Repub won 79.50*** 91.55*** 126.15*** 128.76***
(30.267) (30.373) (49.366) (48.234)
Bandwidth 0.084 0.080 0.082 0.082
Party Change X X X X
Controls X X X X
Senate/House X X
President X X
Effective Observations 97 100 95 100
Total Observations 291 299 289 297
Three years after election Four years after election
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Repub won 268.81*** 255.16*** 172.33*** 185.74***
(56.777) (52.092) (63.793) (59.714)
Bandwidth 0.088 0.099 0.103 0.100
Party Change X X X X
Controls X X X X
Senate & House X X
President X X
Effective Observations 98 115 112 113
Observations 276 284 273 280
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated using local-linear regression, optimal bandwidth, triangular kernel and robust confidence intervals calculated
using rdrobust (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014)
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Table 7: RD Estimates for FDI Manufacturing Per Capita: Governor Characteristics
One year after election Two years after election
Repub won 91.56*** 131.65***
(33.732) (49.115)
Bandwidth 0.124 0.09
Party Change X X
Controls X X
Governor Characteristics X X
Effective Observations 134 102
Observations 287 285
Three years after election Four years after election
Repub won 240.92*** 166.61***
(53.041) (64.648)
Bandwidth 0.100 0.104
Party Change X X
Controls X X
Governor Characteristics X X
Effective Observations 108 109
Observations 273 269
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated using local-linear regression, optimal bandwidth, triangular kernel and robust confidence intervals calculated
using rdrobust (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014)
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Figures
Figure 1: Margins of victory
30
Note: The plotted estimates are based on the preferred specifications with all controls and the confidence levels are
presented at 90% and 95%.
Figure 2: RD estimates on FDI, 1 to 4 years after election
31
Note: The plotted estimates are based on the preferred specifications with all controls and the confidence levels are
presented at 90% and 95%.
Figure 3: RD estimates on FDI Manufacturing, 1 to 4 years after election
32
One year after election Two years after election
Three years after election Four years after election
Note: The vote share is multiplied by 1000. The black dots are averages in 0.5% bins and shaded are 95% confidence
intervals.
Figure 4: The effect of electing a Republican governor on change in FDI in Manufacturing
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Figure 5: McCrary density of victory margin
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Appendix
Table A1: RD Estimates for FDI Manufacturing Per Capita: 5% & 10% Bandwidth
One year after election Two years after election
5% 10% 5% 10 %
Repub won 52.03** 78.77** 76.26* 151.85*
(28.376) (27.188) (59.362) (44.543)
Bandwidth 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.1
Party Change X X X X
Controls X X X X
Effective Observations 63 121 63 120
Total Observations 299 299 297 297
Three years after election Four years after election
5% 10% 5% 10 %
Repub won 264.07*** 240.62*** 274.39*** 173.91***
(62.409) (51.785) (58.450) (59.688)
Bandwidth 0.05 0.1 0.05 0.1
Party Change X X X X
Controls X X X X
Effective Observations 60 115 58 113
Observations 284 284 280 280
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated using local-linear regression, optimal bandwidth, triangular kernel and robust confidence intervals calculated
using rdrobust (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014)
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Table A2: RD Estimates for FDI Manufacturing Per Capita: Second Order Polynomial
One year after election Two years after election
Repub won 111.95*** 204.25***
(43.043) (65.421)
Bandwidth 0.131 0.138
Party Change X X
Controls X X
Effective Observations 145 152
Observations 299 297
Three years after election Four years after election
Repub won 313.09*** 277.46***
(72.291) (70.448)
Bandwidth 0.117 0.131
Party Change X X
Controls X X
Effective Observations 128 135
Observations 284 280
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated using local-linear regression, optimal bandwidth, triangular kernel and robust confidence intervals calculated
using rdrobust (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014)
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Table A3: RD Estimates for FDI Manufacturing Per Capita: Exclude Big Industrialized
States
One year after election Two years after election
Repub won 82.97*** 159.31***
(30.069) (48.731)
Bandwidth 0.097 0.098
Party Change X X
Controls X X
Effective Observations 111 110
Observations 278 276
Three years after election Four years after election
Repub won 245.29*** 171.21***
(56.184) (62.551)
Bandwidth 0.095 0.098
Party Change X X
Controls X X
Effective Observations 104 105
Observations 265 261
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated using local-linear regression, optimal bandwidth, triangular kernel and robust confidence intervals calculated
using rdrobust (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014)
37
Table A4: RD Estimates for FDI Manufacturing Per Capita: 99% & 95% Winsorizing
One year after election Two years after election
99% 95% 99% 95%
Repub won 76.424*** 53.805** 149.80*** 138.02***
(26.729) (23.390) (44.624) (41.108)
Bandwidth 0.105 0.138 0.095 0.119
Party Change X X X X
Controls X X X X
Effective Observations 126 152 116 136
Observations 299 299 297 297
Three years after election Four year after election
99% 95% 99% 95%
Repub won 240.71*** 239.98*** 168.22*** 179.54***
(51.467) (46.506) (59.570) (48.571)
Bandwidth 0.101 0.104 0.105 0.117
Party Change X X X X
Controls X X X X
Effective Observations 115 117 117 127
Observations 284 284 280 280
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated using local-linear regression, optimal bandwidth, triangular kernel and robust confidence intervals calculated
using rdrobust (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014)
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Table A5: RD Estimates for FDI Manufacturing as Percent of GSP
One year after election Two years after election
Repub won 0.0044*** 0.0076***
(0.0012) (0.0019)
Bandwidth 0.078 0.092
Party Change X X
Controls X X
Effective Observations 98 113
Observations 299 297
Three years after election Four years after election
Repub won 0.0126*** 0.0110***
(0.0021) (0.0038)
Bandwidth 0.105 0.120
Party Change X X
Controls X X
Effective Observations 118 128
Observations 284 280
Standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Estimated using local-linear regression, optimal bandwidth, triangular kernel and robust confidence intervals calculated
using rdrobust (Calonico, Cattaneo and Titiunik, 2014)
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